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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to determine to what extent and how federal
taxes aﬀect local tax decisions. Testing the impact of an increase in the
federal tax on horizontal tax competition with Canada-US data for 1984—
1994, we find evidence that an increase in federal tax aﬀects horizontal tax
competition. The novelty of our approach is that it indirectly tests the
eﬀect of an increase in federal tax on provincial tax, by testing whether
provincial reaction to an increase in neighboring tax changes according to
the federal tax level. The test allows for control of yearly macroeconomic
shocks by inserting dummies for each year. These are not used in the
empirical literature on vertical tax competition because they would cause
perfect collinearity with the federal tax.
Keywords: horizontal externality, vertical externality, tax competi-
tion, tax rate.
JEL classification: H21.
1 Introduction1
Federal tax is fixed in the cross section and does not normally vary by province or
state. The literature regresses local tax rate on the federal tax rate as Besley and
Rosen (1998) do, finding a positive coeﬃcient. This method prevents checking for
year eﬀects, because the federal tax rate in a panel data set does not have a state
dimension, and insertion of year eﬀects results in an insignificant coeﬃcient for the
federal tax rate, which is a linear combination of year eﬀects. The typical problem
in these studies is that the federal tax-coeﬃcient can be significant because it picks
up yearly macroeconomic shocks. Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) analyzed
the vertical externality for the US using a state average federal income tax rate
instead of the marginal federal tax rate. The tax rate calculated in this way
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varies by state, so that the method is able to control for year eﬀects. They also
find a positive coeﬃcient. Andersson et al. (2004) test the presence of vertical
externality on income tax rates using data on the Swedish local and regional
public sector for the period 1981-1990. In this case they are able to control for
year fixed eﬀects because their high jurisdiction tax level varies by counties, which
are 24: they find a negative coeﬃcient.
Interestingly, some recent studies put together horizontal and vertical fiscal
externalities with contrasting results. Goodspeed (2000) used a data set with 13
OECD provinces for the period 1975—1984. A poverty index was used as a mea-
sure of intra-province mobility: the poorer the less mobile people are, the smaller
is the horizontal externality. The author used local income tax as a dependent
variable and found a negative sign for the federal tax rate and for the mobility
index. Boadway and Hayashi (2001), using Canadian annual data for 1963—1996,
tested horizontal and vertical tax competition by considering corporate taxes on
businesses. They found a negative sign for the vertical externality and positive
sign for the horizontal externality. Each estimate was for a single province or an
average province. This result is confirmed by Karkalakos, Kotsogiannis (2007),
who extend the previous work exploring fiscal interactions for all ten fiscal au-
tonomous provincial governments. Revelli (2003) studied the non-metropolitan
two-tier system of local government in England–comprising 34 counties and 238
districts–using per capita current expenditure for the financial year 2000/2001,
disaggregated into various functions of interest. He found that horizontal exter-
nality disappears when a vertical externality coeﬃcient is introduced, arguing
that the only relevant externality is the last one. Interestingly, Devereux et al.
(2007) found the opposite for the US using panel data for 1977—1997: vertical
externality for cigarette and gasoline taxes was not significant if there was also
a test for horizontal externality, which was significant. None of these studies,
even if controlling for neighboring taxes, have checked for year eﬀects. Finally
Brulhart and Jametti (2006) use a local-regional panel data and build an income
tax rate index for Switzerland for the years 1985, 1991, 1995 and 1998. They
find a positive link between the tax chosen by the canton and that chosen by
the municipality, and that vertical tax externality prevails over horizontal tax
externality. They obtain this latter result by using an indirect estimate of the
sum of these two esternalities through a "smalleness" index of the municipality.
They can control for year eﬀects because, as in Andersson et al. (2004), the high
jurisdiction tax level varies by canton, of which there are 23 in their panel.
This study introduces year eﬀects and estimates the eﬀect of a change in
federal tax on tax-competition behavior. If an increase in federal tax aﬀects
the tax-rate choice of a province after an increase in the tax rate on the same
mobile tax base of a neighboring province, this means that there is a link between
tax rates chosen at the federal and local levels on the same tax base. This test
enables one to control for year eﬀects, avoiding collinearity with the federal tax.
Goodspeed (2002), extending some earlier results (Goodspeed, 2000), found that
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the vertical externality aﬀects the horizontal externality (measured through a
poverty index; Goodspeed, 2000) in an income tax environment by oﬀsetting it.
In his study, diﬀerently from the present one, there was no check for year eﬀects.
Moreover, the present study uses tax rates rather than the ratio of tax revenue to
GNP; it also does not estimate the horizontal externality, but the tax competition
coeﬃcient and interacts the independent tax variable (the mean of the taxes of
the neighbors) with the federal tax variable. It finds that the federal tax rate
aﬀects the neighboring average tax rate in explaining the variance of a province’s
own tax rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the second section re-
ports an empirical test. Section 3 outlines a theoretical model and explains the
empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The empirical test
We use a Canada2—US data set for 1984—1994 to estimate if there is any significant
strategic link between federal and provincial taxation when tax is levied on the
same tax base. In the literature this has been carried out by regressing the local
tax rate on the federal tax rate (Besley and Rosen, 1998). It should be noted that
the federal tax coeﬃcient can be significant because it picks up a year, or trend
eﬀect. On first glance at our data, it seems that both situations are particularly
true. Fig. 1 shows trends, normalized by province, for Canadian provincial,
federal and mean neighboring taxes on cigarettes, expressed in 1989 US$. The
three variables are well correlated for every province and trend up to 1993. From
91 to 93 there was a strong federal no-smoking policy and federal taxes increased,
followed by provincial taxes as well. In 1994, federal tax was drastically cut to
counteract smuggling from the US; almost all provinces adopted the cut. We
conclude that the federal tax eﬀect cannot be estimated by omitting year eﬀects,
which also allow for control for the trend eﬀect.3
We split the sample into two subsamples. One subsample is relative to the
years when the federal tax on cigarettes, expressed in 1989 US$, is low (this the
period 1984—1990 and 1994 when the federal tax was less than 0.462 per pack of 20
cigarettes) and the other subsample relates to the years when the federal tax on
cigarettes is high (it is the period 1991—1993: the federal tax was larger than 0.894
per pack of 20 cigarettes). To understand whether there are some regularities in
the tax-rates relations of the subsamples considered, we regress each province’s
own tax on the average of the neighboring Canadian taxes and interact this
coeﬃcient with a dummy equal to 1 for the high federal tax subsample and
control for the time trend. Table 2 shows that the tax competition coeﬃcient is
2We excluded the three territories of Nunavut, Northwest Territories and Yukon because
they represent a very small part of Canada in terms of population, income and tax base.
3A trend variable is a linear combination of the dummies for year eﬀects.
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lower when the federal tax is high (0.3522-0.1431) than when it is low (0.3522):
the interaction coeﬃcient is negative (-0.1431).
This preliminary check suggests that the provincial tax reaction to a change
in the mean neighboring provincial tax changes according to the federal tax level,
supporting the idea that the federal tax matters in provincial tax decisions. If
the federal authority intervenes by introducing a central tax, it aﬀects the local
welfare and the choice of the provincial tax, and thus the tax-rate response to an
increase in tax rate in a neighboring province. The next sections investigate this
issue in more detail.
2.1 Estimation Strategy
To isolate the independent impact of the neighboring tax rates on Canadian
provincial tax, the other variables that might aﬀect the provincial tax rates must
be taken into account. Therefore, we control for the US neighboring tax rates.
Moreover the provincial tax rate on goods depends on several other types of vari-
ables. Provincial taxation may be influenced by the economic and demographic
environment. We controlled for this by using socioeconomic variables (see data
appendix). For all of these variables we computed the corresponding mean vari-
able for the neighboring Canadian provinces and neighboring US states for each
Canadian province. The political party of the provincial government may also
aﬀect the tax-rate level: we divided the Canadian party system into three main
groups: the conservative-progressive group, which is right wing; the liberal group,
which is center; and the left wing group, comprising the Democratic-Progressives,
the Quebec party and the Social Credit party. We then build two dummies ac-
counting for the premier of the province being liberal or conservative-progressive.
Finally, we have dichotomous variables to control for province and year eﬀects.
We check the eﬀect of federal tax on the tax competition coeﬃcient by estimating
the following equation on the entire data set:
tst = αs + βt + γ1hst + γ2vthst + γ3mst + θxst + st (1)
where: tst is the tax rate for province s and year t; αs is the province fixed eﬀect;
hst is the tax-rate average for the provinces neighboring province s in year t; vt is
the federal tax rate in year t; mst is the tax-rate average of the US states neigh-
boring province s in year t; xst is a vector of the province-specific time-varying
variables POPst, CHILDst, AGEDst, GRANTst, UNEMPst, INC, INC2; the
corresponding Canadian and US neighboring variables for INCst and INC2st com-
puted respectively as hst and mst; the dummies for the premier of the province
being liberal or conservative-progressive and st is the error term.
Note that γ1 + γ2vt is the slope of the tax-rate reaction function for a given
mean of the federal tax. After the results of the preliminary check reported in
the previous section, we may want to test γ2 < 0: an increase in the federal tax
rate decreases the coeﬃcient of the tax-rate reaction function.
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2.1.1 Instrumentation
The mean Canadian neighboring tax rate and its interactions are endogenous,
because they can also be influenced by the Canadian provinces. The mean neigh-
boring US tax rate, mst may clearly be endogenous: the US rate mean may also
be influenced by the Canadian provinces.
If this is a structural model, a simple OLS estimate of (1) would suﬀer from
endogeneity bias: the error term st would be correlated with the error terms of
the other simultaneous equations of the system. The endogeneity bias arises from
the fact that we are dealing with simultaneous equations. We use the two-stage
least squares method: first we estimate the reduced forms of the endogenous
variables and then substitute their fitted values into (1). The residuals of this
last equation are corrected using the actual values of the endogenous variables.4
We instrumented the mean Canadian neighboring tax rate hst with the neigh-
boring Canadian variables forAGEDst, vthst firstly withAGEDst and UNEMPst,
interacted with vt and secondly with AGEDst and UNEMPst, interacted with
FED UNEMPt.5 Finally, we instrumented the mean US neighboring tax rate
with the US neighboring variables for POPst
In a reduced-form equation, the tax rate on cigarettes is reasonably linked to
the size of the population: this variable influences the available tax base and the
cost of public goods. Moreover, the age structure influences taxation according
to the relative preference for social policies. It is reasonable to think that these
neighboring variables do not aﬀect the provincial tax rate on cigarettes. The
economic cycle is also important in determining the tax rate level, and this is
captured by UNEMPst.
We finally have 4 instruments, and therefore Eq. (1), which has three endoge-
nous variables, is identified.
Moreover, in the second-stage equation we also control for demographic vari-
ables POPst, CHILDst, AGEDst and variables controlling for the economic cycle
like GRANTst, UNEMPst, INCst and INC2st.
Spatial error dependence may arise when the error includes some omitted vari-
ables not captured in the covariates, which are themselves spatially dependent.
If the spatial dependence is ignored the estimation may be biased (Brueckner,
2001; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001). We deal with this problem by controlling
4The two-stage least squares strategy would deliver residuals using the fitted values of the
endogenous variables. Since we are estimating a structural model, we are interested in the
residuals using the actual values of the endogenous variables.
We execute the procedure using the ivreg2 command of STATA, which already gives the
corrected residuals with the actual values of the endogenous variables.
5In the first case we estimate a Stackelberg model where the federal government moves first
and the provinces follow, which implies an exogenous federal tax; in the second case the federal
government moves simultaneously with the provincial governments and therefore the federal
tax is endogenous. Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) explore diﬀerences in statics-comparative
results between the two models.
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for a variable proxying the neighboring economic environment: the neighboring
Canadian variables for INCst and its square, and symmetric variables for the
neighboring US states. If those variables are omitted, they may generate a spu-
rious correlation between a province’s own tax and the neighboring tax or other
exogenous covariates.
After performing the two-stage least squares regressions, we test the validity
of the instruments using the Hansen J-test,6 the minimized value of the GMM
criterion function. The joint null hypothesis is that the excluded instruments
are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that they are
correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null, the test statistic
is distributed as χ2 in the number of overidentifying restrictions.
2.2 Results
Table 3 first reports a simple OLS regression (column 1) that tests for vertical
and horizontal externalities: the coeﬃcients are both positive and significant at
the 1% level. In this regression we control for province eﬀects and take account of
trends or macroeconomic shocks using federal GDP and deficit. When we instru-
ment the Canadian and US average neighboring taxes (column 2), the federal tax
is not significant and the overidentification test is not satisfactory (P = 0.42).
Column 3 shows a specification whereby the federal tax is instrumented with the
federal unemployment. The federal tax coeﬃcient increases, becoming significant
at the 10% level and the overidentification test is worse (P = 0.22). This means
that the instruments are not good, or that the specification is not correct because
some variable correlated with the instruments is missing. We opt for the second
argument and estimate a model with year eﬀects, dropping the federal tax coef-
ficient. We adopt a specification whereby the federal tax is interacted with the
mean of the neighboring taxes. Specifically (Table 4) we estimate the horizontal
tax-competition coeﬃcient: γ1 + γ2vt. This is the slope of the tax-rate reaction
function, and the interesting coeﬃcient is γ2.
In Table 4 γ2 = −3.51 is negative and significant at the 1% level, meaning that
an increase in federal tax decreases the tax reaction to an increase in the mean
of the neighboring taxes. Finally, the overidentification test greatly improves
(P = 0.76), supporting the idea that the interaction term and the year eﬀects
were really missing variables. We also checked a model assuming the federal
6The Hansen-Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. For the eﬃcient GMM
estimator, the test statistic is Hansen’s J-statistic, the minimized value of the GMM criterion
function. For the 2SLS estimator, the test statistic is Sargan’s statistic, typically calculated as
N × R2 from a regression of the IV residuals on the full set of instruments. The J-statistic
is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity; Sargan’s statistic is not. Since we use the
command “robust" and therefore assume the presence of heteroskedasticity, which is quite
common in a panel for a federal nation such as Canada, we use, as STATA does, Hansen’s
J-statistic, which allows observations to be correlated within groups.
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tax as endogenous, instrumenting the federal tax interaction with the federal
unemployment, and the result did not change (column 2 of table 4)
3 Making sense of the results
Consider a federation with two provinces and a federal government maximizing
their welfare functions. One mobile good is produced using one input with a
constant return to scale technology. The good is taxed according to the desti-
nation principle. Using the same tecnology a good not mobile is also produced.
This good is not taxed. The production cost of the two goods is normalized to 1.
When the destination principle (people pay tax where they consume the good)
holds, cross-border shopping for the taxed good may occur.
We model the interaction between the federal government and the province
as a Stackelberg game (Boadway et al., 1998; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002).
Let i = 1, 2 index the two provinces. In the first stage, the central government
chooses the federal tax T by maximizing its welfare, and in the second stage each
province chooses its tax rate ti, by maximizing its own welfare, given the federal
tax choice. Each citizen in province i has mi + 1 units of endowments; she uses
one unit to pay the net of tax price of the taxed good, with inelastic demand
equal to 1. With the remaining units she pays taxes on the mobile good and
consumes the other good. Each citizen can move to buy the mobile good in the
province where it is cheaper, bearing a transport cost δ per unit of distance d.
We solve the model by backward induction.
3.1 The consumer decision
Let ti be the specific unit tax on the mobile good, levied by province i. Assume
that t1 > t2. The consumer in province 1 decides where to buy the good according
to her net surplus. If the customer buys in province 1, she pays t1 plus the
production cost. If the customer crosses the border and buys in province 2, she
pays d+ t2 plus the production cost. Therefore consumer in province 1 will shop
from province 2 until:
d1δ + t2 = t,
then:
d1 =
t1 − t2
δ
, (2)
where d1 is the distance from the border of the consumer in province 1, who is
indiﬀerent between shopping in province 1 or cross the border and shopping in
province 2. Moreover, since consumers in 1 are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], k
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is also the number of residents in province 1, buying goods from province 2, for
a given t1 − t2.
If t1 ≤ t2, analogously we obtain:
d2 =
t2 − t1
δ
, (3)
where d2 is the distance from the border of the consumer in province 2, who
is indiﬀerent between shopping in province 2 or cross the border and shop in
province 1. d2 is also the number of residents in 2, buying from province 1, for a
given t2 − t1.
Finally, if t1 > t2:
B1 = 1− d1, (4)
and if t1 ≤ t2:
B1 = 1 + d2, (5)
where B1 is the tax base faced by province 1, whose population is normalized to
1. We can simplify the notation by defining:
n(t1, t2) =
½
−d1 if t1 > t2
d2 if t1 ≤ t2.
(6)
It follows that:
B1 = 1 + n(t1, t2), (7)
and:
B2 = 1− n(t1, t2), (8)
where n is the incoming or outgoing mobile tax-base quota depending on which
tax regime we are dealing with.
3.2 The province problem
At the second stage province i maximizes the following function:
Wi = ln
µ
1− ti − tj
δ
¶
ti + ln (mi − T − ti) + γ(1) lnu, (9)
with i 6= j. The first term is the utility from revenue collected by the province
taxing the good; the second term is the utility for the representative citizen,
from consumption of the good not taxed, after paying federal and provincial tax
and buying the taxed good in her province; the third term is the utility from
consumption of the taxed good, x with γ (x) = 1 if x ≥ 1 and γ (x) = 0 if x < 1
and finally u > 1.7 These assumptions imply that the demand for the good x is
inelastic and equal to one. (See appendix only for the referee)
7For a general theory on utility with models of discrete choice see Peitz (1995).
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Provincial taxation of the mobile good is distorted by the mobility incentive
and the presence of a higher layer of government. In particular, if the province
tax rate on the good x is equal to ti, tax revenue for province i is equal to
ti
³
1− ti−tjδ
´
, but the burden for taxpayers (in terms of forgone consumption of
the other good) is equal to (mi−T − ti), because taxpayers bear also the federal
tax T . Note that (9) implies that the province cares about revenue and the
indirect utility of a representative citizen buying the taxed good in her province.
In particular the second term of (9) implies that the larger ti and/or T , the
smaller the utility from the endowment quota available to buy the other good.
At the first stage the federal government solves the following problem:
Max
T
ln 2T +
2X
i=1
ln
µ
1−
t∗i − t∗j
δ
¶
t∗i +
2X
i=1
ln (mi − T − t∗i )
Where t∗i and t
∗
j are second stage tax rates equilibrium. Notice that a subgame
perfect equilibrium must necessarily deliver:
ti − tj
δ
< 1 (10)
and
mi − T − ti > 0. (11)
3.3 The reaction function
Let us explore the second stage first order conditions. Province i chooses ti, which
maximizes (9), obtaining the following first order condition:
dWi
dti
=
δ − 2ti + tj
δti − t2i + titj
− 1
mi − T − ti
= 0, (12)
it follows:
(δ − 2ti + tj) (mi − T − ti)− (δ − ti + tj) ti = 0, (13)
Implicitly diﬀerentiating (13) with respect to ti and tj and defining A =
T + 2ti −mi:
dti
dtj
=
A
2 (A+ ti − tj − δ)
> 0. (14)
Proof: (10) and (11) imply that if (13) holds then:
δ − 2ti + tj > 0 (15)
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Moreover, since δ− 2ti + tj < δ− ti + tj, then, when (13) holds mi− T − ti > ti,
which is:
A = 2ti + T −mi < 0. (16)
Finally using (15) and (11):
A+ ti − tj − δ = 2ti − tj − δ − (mi − T − ti) < 0. (17)
Use of (16) and (17) implies the sign of (14).
Implicit diﬀerentiation with respect to ti and T of (13) gives:
dti
dT
= − δ − 2ti + tj
2 (A+ ti − tj − δ)
. (18)
Since we know from above that A+ ti − tj − δ < 0, and from (15) we know that
the numerator of (18) is positive, then dtidT > 0.
How does the existence of a federal tax on the same tax base aﬀect the reaction
function of one provice with respect to the other province tax rate? To answer
this question we must compute the following derivative of (14) with respect to T ,
at the second stage tax-rates equilibrium:
dti
dtjdT
=
(ti − tj − δ)
¡
1 + 2dtidT
¢
−A
³
dti
dT −
dtj
dT
´
2 (A+ ti − tj − δ)2
< 0.
This holds in the symmetric case (m1 = m2) and also in the asymmetric case
(m1 6= m2) if the distance between m1 and m2 is not too big.
4 Conclusions
We have tested the impact of an increase in federal tax on tax competition,
providing evidence that an increase in federal tax aﬀects tax competition, since
provinces behave diﬀerently after an increase in federal tax. Federal tax matters,
because it aﬀects the welfare of the province: that is, it decreases the sensitivity
of the province tax to a change in tax of the neighboring provinces.
The novelty of this approach is that one can indirectly test the eﬀect of an
increase in federal tax on the provincial tax by controlling for yearly macroeco-
nomic shocks, which are not used in the standard empirical literature because
they would be perfectly collinear with the federal tax. We accordingly test the
coeﬃcient of the variable for the interaction between federal tax and the mean of
the neighboring taxes. The paper developed a test using a data set for Canada
and US running from 1984 to 1994 for specific cigarette taxes.
Several extensions of this work are possible. On the empirical side, it would
be useful to collect data on border densities and border lengths. It is likely that
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each state fixes its tax rate, being aware of the neighboring rates, where popu-
lation density near the border and the length of the border are greater. From a
theoretical point of view, it would be interesting to explore the political economy
reasons that could determine the ambiguous sign of the vertical externality re-
ported previously in the literature: friendly provinces could decide to sustain the
federal authority’s decision to increase the federal tax by decreasing their own,
while other, non-friendly provinces could do the opposite.
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5 Data Appendix
tst Canadian cigarette tax rate, for province s in year t, divided by the Canadian
CPI and the Canada-US PPP index; these rates are provided by the Finance
departments of the ten considered provinces and are expressed in Canadian dollars
per pack of 20 cigarettes.
5.1 Endogenous variables
vt is the federal Canadian cigarette tax rate. This is from the National Clearing-
house on Tobacco and Health for Canada.
hst is the mean of the tax rates in year t of the Canadian provinces bordering
on province s, divided by the Canadian CPI and the Canada-US PPP index.
mst mean of the tax rates of the US states bordering on province s in year
t, divided by the US CPI. The tax rates on cigarettes for the United States are
taken from http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/acir.html: cigarette tax rates
are expressed in US dollars per pack of 20 cigarettes.
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5.2 Demographic and economic variables
POPst is the number of persons in province s in year t. It is taken from www.
statcan.ca for Canada and www.census.gov for the US.
CHILD is the ratio of individuals aged 5—17 years to the total population of
province s in year t, taken from www.statcan.ca for Canada.
AGEDst is the ratio of individuals of over 65 years of age to the total pop-
ulation of province s in year t, taken from www.statcan.ca for Canada and
www.census.gov for the US.
UNEMPst is the unemployment rate for province s in year t, taken from
www.statcan.ca for Canada and from www.stats.bls.gov for the US.
INCst is the per-capita income for province s in year t divided by the CPI
and PPP index. Income data were taken from www.statcan.ca.
GRANTst is the federal grant-in-aid over GDP for province s in year t. Federal
grant-in-aid data for Canada were taken from www.statcan.ca.
PROG− CONSst is dummy=1 if the premier of the province is Progressive
Conservatives, taken from http://www.swishweb.com/Politics/Canada.
LIBERALst dummy=1 if the premier of the province of Liberal Party, taken
from http://www.swishweb.com/Politics/Canada.
FED GDP is the federal GDP for year t divided by the CPI and PPP index,
taken from www.statcan.ca.
FED UNEMP is the federal unemployment for year t, taken from www.
statcan.ca.
FED DEFICIT is the federal deficit for year t, taken from www.statcan.ca.
The PPP (Parity Purchasing Power) index for Canada-US was downloaded
from the OECD web site.
The US CPI was taken from the Statistical Abstracts of the United provinces
(2000).
The Canadian CPI was taken from http://www.statcan.ca.
5.3 The neighboring variables
A neighboring Canadian variable for province s in year t is computed as the mean
of the variable in all the Canadian provinces neighboring province s in year t.
The neighboring Canadian x variable is defined as: C NEIGH x.
A neighboring United States variable for province s in year t is computed as
the mean of the variable in all the US states neighboring province s in year t.
The neighboring United States x variable is defined as: US NEIGH x.
An example: suppose there are four neighboring provinces (defined as n =
2, 3, 4, 5), then the neighboring Canadian xst variable for province 1 in year t
would be:
C NEIGH x1t =
P
s∈n
xst
4
.
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6 Appendix only for the attention of the referee
The citizen buying the taxed good in her province solves the following problem:
max
x,y
u(x, y) = ln y + γ(x) lnu
s.t. : mi + 1 = (1 + ti + T )x+ y
(19)
Notice that by assumption if x ≥ 1 then γ(x) = 1, implying that the solution
of the optimization problem is x = 1; substituting the budget constraint with
x = 1 in the utility function:
v(1,mi − ti − T ) = ln (mi − ti − T ) + lnu. (20)
By assumption if x < 1 then γ(x) = 0, implying that the solution of the opti-
mization problem is x = 0; substituting the budget constraint with x = 0 in the
utility function:
v(0,mi + 1) = ln (mi + 1) . (21)
The last step to solve (19) is comparing (20) with (21):
v(1,mi−ti−T ) > v(0,mi+1) if and only if 1+ti+T <
(u− 1) (mi + 1)
u
. (22)
Condition (22) must be satisfied if a subgame perfect equilibrium , T, t1, t2,
with positive revenues holds. Hence the citizen buying the good in her province
chooses:
y = mi − ti − T
and
x = 1.
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TAX (province unit cigarette tax,  1989 US$)
110 0.8057 0.2962 0.2121 1.5347
C NEIGH TAX (neighboring Canadian province
average unit cigarette tax, 1989 US$) 110 0.7778 0.2417 0.2121 1.3254
FED TAX (Federal unit cigarette tax, 1989 US$) 
110 0.5505 0.2297 0.2277 0.9236
US NEIGH TAX (neighboring US state unit cigarette
tax,1989 US$) 110 0.2075 0.1174 0 0.3947
POP *10-7 (province population) 110 0.2718 0.3110 0.0127 1.0828
UNEMP (unemployment rate)
110 11.4873 3.7242 5 21
AGED (proportion of population over 65)
110 0.1147 0.0163 0.0751 0.1443
CHILD (proportion of population between 5-17)
110 0.1920 0.0171 0.1693 0.2533
INC*10-3 (province income per capita in 1989 US$)
110 13.2187 1.9920 9.4915 17.0063
GRANT (federal grants divided by provincial
population) 110 0.0011 0.0005 0.0004 0.0020
C NEIGH UNEMP (neighboring Canadian province
average unemployment rate) 110 10.9308 2.4546 6.25 15.50
US NEIGH UNEMP (neighboring US state average
unemployment rate) 110 4.8178 2.6718 0 8.64
C NEIGH POP (neighboring Canadian province
average population) 110 3060374 1942044 423817 7207302
US NEIGH POP (neighboring US state average
population) 110 2474501 3165001 0 11100000
C NEIGH AGED (neighboring Canadian province
average proportion of population over 65) 110 0.1133 0.0131 0.0751 0.1351
US NEIGH AGED (neighboring US state average
proportion of population over 65) 110 0.1034 0.0522 0 0.1396
C NEIGH INC *10-3 (neighboring Canadian province
average income per capita) 110 13.4088 1.3908 10.0837 15.8977
US NEIGH INC *10-3 (neighboring US state average
income per capita) 110 12.7175 6.5527 0 19.2380
FED GDP (Federal GDP in 1989 million US $) 110 476244 30031 423106 535407
FED UNEMP (Federal unemployment rate) 110 9.7273 1.3761 8 11
FED DEFICIT (federal deficit in 1989 million US $) 110 -23471 3535 -29763 -17926
PROG-CONS dummy =1 if the Premier of the province
is  Progressive Conservative 110 0.4182 0.4955 0 1
LIBERAL dummy =1 if the Premier of the province is
of the Liberal Party 110 0.3445 0.4777 0 1
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Notes: Figures are means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum, based on annual data for the years
1984-1994, inclusive, for the following ten Canadian provinces: Alberta, Ontario, British Columbia Saskatchewan,
Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunsweek, Quebec, Manitoba (110 observations).
 C NEIGH TAX .3522
(  3.00)***
 C NEIGH TAX* dummy HIGH FED TAX  -.1431
(2.25)**
 year .0356
(3.90)***
constant -70.1863
(3.88)***
Observations 110
Prob>F 0.0000
Adj R-squared 0.4538
R-squared 0.4689
Notes: We splitted the sample into two subsamples, according to the federal tax.
A dummy for the high federal tax years (91-92-93) is interacted with the tax-
competition coefficient. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics (with robust
standard errors). Variables are defined in table 1 and described in detail in the
data appendix.
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: province cigarette tax (specific unit tax), 1984-1994.
Table 2: Federal tax and  horizontal tax competition in Canada.
Table 3: Federal tax (specific unit tax) on cigarettes.
(1) (2) (3)
FEDERAL TAX 0.4238 -0.4535 0.5895
(2.77)*** (1.18) (1.88)*
C NEIGH TAX 0.6703 2.1426 1.2342
(4.15)*** (3.85)*** (3.87)***
US NEIGH TAX -1.0645 -0.2016 -1.4502
(1.47) (0.13) (1.32)
GRANT -3.6760 -8.6016 -5.6438
(1.89)* (2.09)** (1.97)**
CHILD -13.6136 -22.8735 -15.2912
(3.08)*** (2.22)** (2.19)**
POP*10-7 -3.5072 -7.5599 -6.1711
(2.17)** (2.42)** (3.06)***
AGED -30.9564 -47.1480 -60.8151
(2.65)*** (3.45)*** (4.64)***
UNEMP 0.0897 0.1226 0.0848
(4.40)*** (3.42)*** (3.12)***
INC*10-3 -0.8301 -0.5658 -0.6562
(2.99)*** (1.40) (2.03)**
INC2 3.2214 1.9725 2.3197
(2.82)*** (1.23) (1.79)*
US NEIGH INC*10-3 0.9915 -0.4729 0.0093
(2.59)** (0.63) (0.02)
US NEIGH INC2 -2.7648 1.9245 0.3906
(2.28)** (0.80) (0.22)
C NEIGH INC*10-3 -1.1967 -1.4903 -1.4173
(3.32)*** (3.07)*** (3.86)***
C NEIGH INC2 4.5712 5.6150 5.2452
(3.13)*** (3.11)*** (3.68)***
LIBERAL -0.0525 -0.1731 -0.1521
(0.79) (1.40) (1.99)**
PROG-CONS 0.0162 -0.1083 -0.0754
(0.32) (1.19) (1.16)
GDP*10-6 4.91 4.57 9.39
(3.36)*** (2.25)** (4.21)***
DEFICIT*10-6 15.9 -0.460 8.63
(2.53)** (0.05) (1.41)
Constant 7.9213 23.1268 17.6042
(2.22)** (2.63)*** (3.30)***
Observations 110 110 110
Centered R-squared 0.8121 0.5037 0.7304
Uncentered R-squared 0.9414 0.9682
Hansen J statistic (overid) 0.4244 0.2382
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: province cigarette tax (specific unit tax), 1984-1994.
Notes: Column (1) presents OLS estimates of the parameters of equation (1), column (2)
is a two stage lest squares estimate where C NEIGH TAX is instrumented and column (3)
presents as well a 2SLS estimate where both C NEIGH TAX and FED TAX are
instrumented. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics for the column (1) and z-statistics
for column (2) and (3), with robust standard errors. Variables are defined in table 1 and
described in detail in the data appendix.
(1) (2)
C NEIGH TAX 2.5991 4.0504
(2.72)*** (1.94)*
C NEIGH TAX * FED TAX -3.5144 -5.8663
(2.80)*** (1.97)**
US NEIGH TAX -1.0637 -3.5116
(0.79) (1.34)
GRANT -7.3861 -6.9936
(3.37)*** (2.48)**
CHILD -9.8944 -12.3094
(1.67)* (1.20)
POP*10-7 -4.9865 -4.8764
(3.61)*** (2.61)***
AGED -39.7100 -37.0020
(3.30)*** (2.08)**
UNEMP 0.0872 0.0994
(3.76)*** (2.40)**
INC*10-3 -0.5921 -0.4365
(2.03)** (1.32)
INC2 2.1018 1.4562
(1.76)* (1.10)
US NEIGH INC*10-3 0.4739 0.1198
(0.81) (0.17)
US NEIGH INC2 -1.0756 0.2519
(0.56) (0.11)
C NEIGH INC*10-3 -1.1684 -1.2181
(3.48)*** (2.47)**
C NEIGH INC2 4.1917 4.4510
(3.07)*** (2.15)**
LIBERAL -0.0603 -0.0746
(0.99) (0.79)
PROG-CONS -0.0002 0.0579
(0.00) (0.62)
Constant 12.8172 14.5301
(3.61)*** (2.61)***
Observations 110 110
Centered R-squared 0.8057 0.6600
Uncentered R-squared 0.9771 0.9598
Hansen J statistic (overid) 0.7617 0.7179
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: The impact of federal tax on horizontal tax competition.
Dependent variable: province cigarette tax (specific unit tax), 1984-1994.
Notes: Column (1) presents a two stages least squares estimate of the parameters of
equation (1) where in the interaction C NEIGH TAX*FED TAX only C NEIGH
TAX is instrumented; in column (2) both C NEIGH TAX and FED TAX are
instrumented. Numbers in parenthesis are z-statistics (with robust standard errors).
Variables are defined in table 1  and described in detail in the data appendix.
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   Fig. 1: tax-rate trends; tax rates normalized by provinces. 
 
